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Abstract
Cloud computing is a boon for both business and private use, but data security concerns slow its adoption. Fully homomorphic encryption 
(FHE) offers the means by which the cloud computing can be performed on encrypted data, obviating the data security concerns. FHE is not 
without its cost, as FHE operations take orders of magnitude more processing time and memory than the same operations on unencrypted data. 
Cloud computing can be leveraged to reduce the time taken by bringing to bear parallel processing. This paper presents an implementation of a 
processing dispatcher which takes an iterative set of operations on FHE encrypted data and splits them between a number of processing engines. 
A private cloud was implemented to support the processing engines. The processing time was measured with 1, 2, 4, and 8 processing engines. The 
time taken to perform the calculations with the four levels of parallelization, as well as the amount of time used in data transfers are presented. In 
addition, the time the computation servers spent in each of addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division are laid out. An analysis of the time 
gained by parallel processing is presented. The experimental results shows that the proposed parallel processing of Gentry’s encryption improves 
the performance better than the computations on a single node. This research provides the following contributions. A private cloud was built to 
support parallel processing of homomorphic encryption in the cloud. A client-server model was created to evaluate cloud computing of the 
Gentry’s encryption algorithm. A distributed algorithm was developed to support parallel processing of the Gentry’s algorithm for evaluation on 
the cloud. An experiment was setup for the evaluation of the Gentry’s algorithm, and the results of the evaluation show that the distributed 
algorithm can be used to speed up the processing of the Gentry’s algorithm with cloud computing.
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1. Introduction
In conventional computing, data centers with computing re-
sources are usually established for data processing. Running a data 
center is costly in order to meet an organization’s maximum needs 
of data processing. In addition, the computing resources are often 
largely idle where the computing resources are underutilized.
Cloud computing provides advantages over the conventional 
computing with data centers. An organization can obtain the 
computing resources from cloud computing provided by a pro-
vider. Instead of purchasing the computing resources, organiza-
tions can purchase computing services from cloud computing 
providers where it is much cheaper then purchasing the comput-
ing resources. Cloud providers are responsible for efficiently 
providing the on-demand computing resources to the organiza-
tions as clients to the cloud providers. The organizations do not 
need to maintain the computing resources and the services are 
charged on the time use of computing resources.
Cloud computing is not without the issues. Organizations 
have concerns in moving their data to a cloud due to the data 
privacy. Possible threats to the data privacy could be from cloud 
providers’ employees, clients, and network hackers. To protect 
data in a public computing environment such as cloud, encryp-
tion seems to be an effective way of enforcing data security in 
a cloud. However, most of existing encryption schemes require 
data to be decrypted for computations where data becomes vul-
nerable during computation of decrypted data. If computations 
can be performed on encrypted data without decryption, then 
the security of data would not be a concern. Homomorphic en-
cryption makes it possible to process encrypted data without 
decryption whereby the encrypted results can only be decrypt-
ed by the client who requests the service.
Homomorphic encryption is an encryption scheme which al-
lows for computations on encrypted data and obtains an en-
crypted result which decrypted produces the same result of 
computations on the original data. In this paper, we will survey 
several efficient, partially homomorphic schemes, and a num-
ber of fully homomorphic, but less efficient schemes. The Gen-
try’s algorithm for fully encryption algorithm will be examined 
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The cloud computing has been widely used for parallel pro-
cessing of mass data (Kamara & Raykova, 2013; Amazon Web 
Services, 2015; Cloudera, 2015; Dean & Ghemawat, 2008). The 
algorithm used in this work’s evaluation is based on the imple-
mentation presented in a 2011 paper by Gentry and Halevi 
(Gentry & Halevi, 2011). The Gentry’s fully homomorphic al-
gorithm seems to be a perfect fit for the cloud because the tasks 
of performing mathematical operations can be analyzed, split, 
and distributed to the nodes in the cloud.
Existing cloud computing offerings are mostly proprietary or 
software that is not amenable to experimentation or instrumen-
tation. In this research, a private cloud based on OpenStack was 
created for experimental instrumentation and study (Hayward 
& Chiang, 2013a, 2013b). The cloud environment consists of 
two computation servers providing the virtualized infrastruc-
ture for execution. The primary cloud server is running on a 
Dell Inspiron N5510. The processor is an Intel Core i5-2410M 
CPU which provides 2 cores running at 2.30 GHz. The com-
puter has 6 GB of RAM. The secondary cloud server is a Leno-
vo T410. It has an Intel M560 CPU which provides 2 cores at 
2.67 GHz. The secondary server has 4 GB of RAM.
A client-server model shown in Figure 1 was built to support 
the parallel processing of the Gentry’s algorithm in the cloud.
The user inputs a set of data in the form of integers and a set 
of computations to perform on the data for the calculation. The 
input data from the user are forwarded to a computation dis-
patcher. The input integers are labeled and referenced as i0, i1, 
i2, ..., and iN. The computation string must be a list of calcula-
tions, and will be performed in the order specified. Each calcu-
lation must further be in the form of an algebraic equation, with 
the input integers being combined with only the addition, sub-
traction, multiplication, and division operators. Parentheses are 
available for changing the order of operations. The results of any 
calculation can be assigned to any number of input, output, or 
temporary variables. The output variables are referenced as o0, 
o1, ..., and oN, and the temporary variables are referenced as t0, 
t1, ..., and tN. Only the output variables are returned to the user.
As the computation dispatcher takes the input data and com-
putations from the user, it converts the input data into a set of 
in detail for the performance issue (Naone, 2015). We then 
present a parallel processing method which can be applied to 
improve the performance of the Gentry’s fully homomorphic 
encryption algorithm by taking advantage of ample computing 
power of a cloud. Finally, the paper is summarized.
2. Homomorphic encryption schemes
Homomorphic encryption schemes allow computations on 
encrypted data and then decrypting the result produces the 
same result as performing the same computations on the unen-
crypted data.
Rivest, Shamir and Adelman (RSA) published the first cryp-
tosystem which was based on the work from Diffie and Hell-
man (Diffie & Hellman, 1976; Rivest et al., 1978a). RSA is 
multiplicatively, but not additively homomorphic (Rivest et al., 
1978b). If the product of two encrypted data is computed, then 
the decrypted result of the product will be the product of the 
two original data. ElGamal encryption scheme is also based on 
the Diffie and Hellman key exchange (Diffie & Hellman, 1976; 
ElGamal, 1985). Like RSA, ElGamal is multiplicatively, but not 
additively homomorphic. 
Paillier encryption scheme allows for homomorphic addition 
of two encrypted data by computing their product and the de-
crypted result of the product will give the sum of their respec-
tive original data (Paillier, 1999). The Paillier encryption 
scheme is not fully homomorphic because it is not possible to 
compute the product of two ciphertexts.
Partially homomorphic encryption schemes including RSA, 
ElGamal, and Paillier allow only either addition or multiplication 
computation on the data, which are not practical for most of 
applications (Lauter et al., 2011). A fully homomorphic encryp-
tion scheme which supports arbitrary computations on data has 
far more practical use than partially homomorphic encryption.
3. Gentry scheme and cloud computing
In 2009, Gentry presented a fully homomorphic encryption 
scheme (Gentry, 2009). Gentry’s scheme starts with a somewhat 
homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices that can only per-
form a limited number of homomorphic operations on encrypted 
data. Gentry then modifies the scheme to a fully homomorphic 
encryption scheme by adding bootstrapping procedure to it (Gen-
try, 2009). Gentry’s scheme was shown to take seconds to perform 
addition, subtraction, and comparison operations on two 8-bit 
integers. The multiplication of two 8-bit integers took minutes 
and the division of two 8-bit integers took hours. The long com-
putational time makes the Gentry’s scheme impractical for many 
applications. Because fully homomorphic encryption is a young 
endeavor, there will almost certainly be improvements made to 
Gentry’s algorithm, reducing the time taken for instructions. For 
example, Fujitsu (Fujitsu, 2013) develops a homomorphic encryp-
tion scheme which performs data encryption at a batch level. 
Compared to the Gentry’s algorithm, Fujitsu claims that their 
batch encryption method can perform encryption faster.
Client
Computation 
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Fig. 1. Client-server model.
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putation dispatcher. It then performs the requested calculations 
in order, placing the results in any of the input, output, or tem-
porary arrays. When the calculations are complete, it then re-
turns the output array. The calculations must be in the form of 
a comma delimited list. The first item in the list must be the 
instruction, and every other element in the list denotes an ele-
ment of one of the input, output or temporary arrays. The sup-
ported instructions include add and multiply, which are binary 
operations assigning the first data element to be the binary ad-
dition or multiplication of the second and third data elements. A 
binary half-adder is supported, with the first and second data 
element being the sum and carry bit of the addition of the third 
and fourth data element. Similarly, a binary full-adder is also 
supported, with the same bit assignments as the half-adder, but 
with an additional carry-in bit added as well.
4. Algorithm
The details of the distributed algorithm for the execution of 
the Gentry’s encryption algorithm in parallel are described in 
this section. When the computation dispatcher receives a re-
quest from the user, it creates a data dependency graph, as de-
tailed in section 4.1. The computation dispatcher then finds a 
sub-circuit for execution as outlined in section 4.2 and dispatch-
ing that sub-circuit, waiting on an execution node to free if nec-
essary. When any computation server completes, the 
computation dispatcher updates the local data store, as well as 
removing the completed instructions from the data dependency 
graph, updating the references to the completed instructions to 
point to the root node. When the root node has no children, then 
the computation is complete and the dispatcher returns to the 
user the requested data.
4.1. Creating data dependency graph
The algorithm in Figure 3 describes how to create the data 
dependency graph from the input circuit E, begin by letting P 
and C be arrays that will have an empty array for each element 
e  E. These two arrays will indicate the parent and child point-
ers in the graph. Further, let D be an associative array that will 
contain the owner of data. D will begin as empty, which will be 
treated as 0, which will denote the root node. Once initializa-
tion is done, the main loop iterates through the elements of E as 
e and index, where index is offset 1, not 0. Take the inputs of e 
and look up from D, which owns the input elements. Let this 
node be d. Denote d as a parent of the current node, and the 
current node as a child of d. For each output, denote owner as 
the node which holds the output. Every dependent of owner will 
be marked as a parent of index, and index will be marked as a 
child of each dependent. Each output of the current operation 
will be updated to be owned by the current operations in D.
4.2. Finding sub-circuit
To find a sub-circuit for execution, the computation dispatch-
er finds any child of the root node (i.e. any member of C[0]) 
encrypted bits for use by the computation server. It also con-
verts the input computation into a list of bit-wise calculations to 
perform on the input data. This list is then parsed into a di-
rected graph, such that each node in the graph represents a cal-
culation, and the edge represents the child that depends on the 
output of the parent. If a node has no such requirement, then it 
has an edge to the root node. For example, if a computation was 
given as Table 1, then Figure 2 shows the graph that would be 
computed. The dispatcher finds a chain of nodes starting from 
the root node, stopping when there is a requirement from a dif-
ferent chain. It then transmits the un-branched chain to the first 
computation server. The dispatcher marks that chain as sent, 
and then repeats until there are no more chains to dispatch. 
When the dispatcher receives a response, it removes the calcu-
lated node from the graph and updates all edges which point to 
the removed node to instead point to the node’s parent. It then 
repeats the process of finding chains over again. If there are no 
more nodes in the graph, then the dispatcher converts the en-
crypted bits back into their respective output integers, and re-
turns the array of those integers.
The computation server receives a public key, an ordered ar-
ray of encrypted bits, and a circuit to evaluate on from the com-
Table 1
Example instruction input.
Number Instruction
1 a = b * c
2 c = d * e
3 d = b * e
4 f = a + b
5 b = c + c
6 d = a * b
7 e = a + b
R
23
5
6
1
4
7
Fig. 2. Example data dependency graph.
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4.3. Blind addition and multiplication
When addition or multiplication computation performed on 
the encrypted data, the maximum output size of the computa-
tion needs be determined. To determine the output size required 
for an addition of n bit-arrays <a1, a2, …, and an>, having bit-
sizes <s1, s2, …, and sn>, the computation server would need to 
find the smallest power of two greater than the sum of the max-
imum size of each ai. To put it another way, the server would 
need to compute
To determine the output size required for a multiplication of 
n bit-arrays <a1, a2, …, and an>, having bit-sizes <s1, s2, …, and 
sn>, the computation server would need to find the smallest 
power of 2 greater than the product of the maximum size of 
each ai. To put it another way, the server would need to compute
which is a child only of the root node, and is not currently pend-
ing execution. Let this  q be c, and let the set E contain only that 
one element. The computation dispatcher marks this node as 
pending execution. It then takes all of the children of c and adds 
them to an ordered array of nodes, candidates, to evaluate for 
execution.
The computation dispatcher then removes the top of the can-
didates array as c. If all of c’s parents are in E, and c is not al-
ready pending execution, then mark c as pending execution, add 
it to E, and add all of its children to candidates. The dispatcher 
repeats this process of candidate evaluation until there are no 
more nodes in candidates []. Figure 4 presents this process.
Fig. 3. Creating data dependency graph.
Fig. 4. Finding sub-circuit.
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The data and keys were transferred to the compute nodes 
with each sub-circuit. This was done to model a real-world sce-
nario where the keys for a given computation would be dynam-
ic, and would need to be retrieved before each execution.
The keys were generated via the keyGen method provided by 
the Gentry-Halevi code with n = 25. Table 2 shows the com-
puted parameters, including s, the number of X vectors, S, the 
size of the bit vectors, p, the bits of precision, and logR, the big 
set size ration. The public key generated was 2.5 MB, and the 
private key was 2.6 MB. They were saved for later use in the 
evaluation.
5.2. Tests performed
The sum of the integers was taken by splitting the 20 integers 
into 10 pairs and finding the sum of each pair. The resulting 
10 integers were then split into 5 pairs, and summed, and so on. 
This pairing for addition was chosen to maximize the parallel 
processing of the computation. See Figure 5 for a visual repre-
sentation of the process.
5. Evaluation of the algorithm
Three computations are performed on the cloud system for 
testing. All three computations are using the same set of data 
which contain 20 random 8-bit integers. The first experiment is 
to compute the sum of these 20 integers. The second is to com-
pute the vector product of the integers. The third one is to com-
pute the variance of the integers. 
In each evaluation, the time taken to compute the depen-
dency graph and each sub-circuit was recorded by the computa-
tion dispatcher. The time to execute each sub-circuit was 
recorded by the individual computation servers and returned to 
the dispatcher for accumulation. The dispatcher also recorded 
the overall time to complete the computation. While the algo-
rithm is capable of evaluating more fine-grained operations, 
integer addition and multiplication were chosen as primitives to 
simplify the evaluation. 
5.1. Setup
To generate the 20 8-bit integers, the random integer generator 
from random.org was used (RANDOM.ORG, 2015). The number 
of integers generated was 20, and the range used was 0 to 255. 
The integers generated were 16; 195; 35; 129; 103; 198; 212; 105; 
252; 58; 51; 184; 219; 39; 244; 179; 154; 129; 217; 171. The three 
evaluation circuits were hand generated, with the sum circuit used 
independently as well as being used as part of the variance circuit.
For the trials with 1, 2, and 4 nodes operations occurred only 
on the primary computer. When processing with 8 nodes, the 
additional 4 nodes were provided by a secondary computer. The 
network connection between them was a wireless network.
Table 2
Key generation parameters.
Parameter Value Description
Q 72 Security parameter
μ 140.034 Hardness parameter
s 15 Sparse sub-set size
S 512 Big set size
p 4 Number of bits of precision
t 384 Bit size of coefficients for Z
n 25 Lattice dimension
R 22 Ratio of elements in the big set
8
15
26
7 6 5 4 3 2 1
36
10
11 7 3
Fig. 5. Sum procedure.
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The time taken to compute the vector product of the integers 
is presented in Table 3. The speedup from 1 to 2 compute nodes 
when computing the vector product of the 20 integers was 1.757. 
The speedup from 1 to 4 compute nodes was 1.9373, and the 
increase from 2 to 4 compute nodes did not include an increase 
in processor availability. In spite of the lack of additional pro-
cessors, there was still a 1.1026 speedup between the 2 and 4 
compute server trials. When increasing from 1 to 8 compute 
nodes, there was a 2.8187 speedup.
The time spent finding the vector product sub-circuits is pre-
sented in Table 6. The time spent finding sub-circuits was less 
in the 2, 4, and 8 node trials than the 1 node trial, with the 2 and 
8 node trials being less than the 1 and 4 node trials. The differ-
ence in time remains negligible. As with the finding of the vari-
ance and sum sub-circuits, the least number of calls to the find 
sub-circuits method was in the 8 node trial.
The time spent evaluating the vector product circuits is pre-
sented in Table 7. There was a jump from the 1 and 2 node level 
to the 4 and 8 node level and the least number of circuits evalu-
ated was in the 8 node configuration. 
The time taken to compute the numerator of the variance of 
the integers is presented in Table 3. The speedup from 1 to 2 
compute nodes when computing the variance of the 20 integers 
was 1.5609. The speedup from 1 to 4 compute nodes was 
1.7103, but the increase from 2 to 4 compute nodes did not also 
include an increase in processor availability. In spite of the lack 
of additional processors, there was still a 1.0957 speedup be-
tween the 2 and 4 compute server trials. When increasing from 
1 to 8 compute nodes, there was a 2.3722 speedup.
The overall time spent finding the variance sub-circuits is 
presented in Table 8. There was once again an increase from the 
time to find sub-circuits with 1 and 2 nodes to 4 and 8 notes, 
though the difference in time is negligible. As with the finding 
of the sum sub-circuits, the least number of calls to the find 
sub-circuits method was in the 8 node trial.
The time spent by the computation servers evaluating the 
variance circuit is presented in Table 9. There was a jump 
from the 1 and 2 node level to the 4 and 8 node level. The least 
number of sub-circuits evaluated was in the 8 node configura-
tion.
5.4. Discussion
The sum trial showed good speedups while all computation 
servers were on the same computer as the dispatcher, but 
dropped off when computation servers were on a separate com-
puter. This drop off is most likely due to network transfer time 
coupled with the small amount of time taken to perform the 
sum operations.
The algorithm showed a good speedup in the more complex 
and time consuming vector product and variance circuits, with 
a speedup of 2.3722 and 2.8187 when distributed over 8 nodes 
and two computers.
Despite the lackluster performance of the sum trial, the 
speedup of the vector product and variance circuits suggests 
that the algorithm is useful for decreasing the time to evaluate 
homomorphic circuits.
The vector product was found by first taking the pair-wise 
product of the integers, producing 10 integers. These integers 
were then summed.
The numerator of the variance of the integers was taken as 
the square of the sum of the integers plus the sum of the squares 
of the integers. The circuit generated to compute the sum of the 
integers was taken as the base circuit. The sum was squared 
into a new output, and each integer was then squared, giving a 
total of 21 integers. These integers were then summed.
5.3. Tests results
The time to perform the three evaluations on 1, 2, 4, and 8 
compute nodes is shown together in Table 3. The computations 
gain the performance as we increase the nodes in the system. 
Most computations are not completely parallelizable and re-
quire some amount of communication between machines. Net-
work communication time can remove the benefits of the 
parallel algorithm on a cloud system when the computation is 
short. In the sum problem, the communications overhead seems 
monopolize the processing time. The algorithm doesn’t take 
into account the network speed, nor does it make predictions 
about operation speed. Also, the algorithm does not prefer to 
dispatch long or slow operations before quick ones, instead dis-
patching them in the order they are discovered.
The time taken to compute the sum of the integers is pre-
sented in Table 3. The speedup of the sum algorithm when in-
creasing from 1 computation node to 2 computation nodes was 
1.3806. The speedup when increasing from 1 node to 4 nodes 
was similar at 1.4044. This lack of speedup can be attributed to 
the hardware used in the evaluation, as it provides two processor 
cores. Each core is hyper-threaded, so that each one appears to 
be two processors to the underlying operating system, but the 
operations performed meant that only one process can operate 
at a time. The speedup from 2 to 4 nodes was 1.0172, despite the 
lack of additional processor resources. The time to execution 
increased from 4 to 8 nodes, which is most likely due to the time 
taken to transfer data from the dispatcher to the remote compu-
tation servers. The speedup from 1 to 8 nodes was 1.0881.
Table 4 shows for each trial the time the dispatcher spent 
finding sub-circuits, and the number of times the method was 
called to find sub-circuits. Although there were fewer calls to 
the find sub-circuits method in the 4 and 8 node trials, the find-
ing of sub-circuits took longer, though not by a significant factor. 
A probable explanation for the increase in time is that the dis-
patcher was running on the same hardware as the computation 
servers, even though they were on different virtual computers. 
This explanation is supported by the lack of increase from 4 to 
8 nodes, as the additional 4 compute nodes were on separate 
hardware. There were 2 fewer calls to the find sub-circuit meth-
od in the 8 node trial, which is common with the variance trials.
The time spent evaluating sub-circuits is presented in Ta-
ble 5. Similar to the time to find sub-circuits, there was an in-
crease from 2 to 4 nodes, but a decrease from 4 to 8 nodes. The 
jump in level is once again most likely due to the limit in pro-
cessor availability across threads, leading to execution waiting 
for processor resources.
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The time to compute sub-circuits was on the order of 
0.0003 s in the sum trials, 0.0004 s in the vector product trials, 
and 0.0018 s in the variance trials. This time is very low when 
compared with the time spent performing the actual computa-
tions. 
6. Conclusions
The computing power and resources of cloud computing are 
more provided than a single machine where the computations 
on data are performed by clusters of machines. Cloud comput-
ing has been widely used to process massive data. However, for 
cloud computing, organizations have a concern of data privacy 
for their data. In this paper, we described the problem of data 
privacy in cloud computing. Fully homomorphic encryption is 
a solution to resolve the data privacy in the cloud where the 
encrypted data are processed and the encrypted results are re-
turned. However, fully homomorphic encryption runs slow and 
the faster fully homomorphic encryption schemes are needed.
Gentry’s encryption scheme is fully homomorphic with slow 
performance. Several methods have been proposed to speed up 
the performance of fully homomorphic encryption schemes. 
Parallel processing is one effective way of doing this 
(Vukmiroviü et al., 2012; Ortega-Cisneros et al., 2014). Our 
parallel processing for Gentry’s encryption was presented in 
this paper and tested in a private cloud computing environment. 
The experimental results show that the proposed parallel pro-
cessing of Gentry’s encryption improves the performance better 
than the computations on a single node.
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